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There were four critical undercurrents for the growth of Korean 
think tanks in the 1990s: democratization, the end of the Cold War, glob- 
alization coupled with local autonomy, and the expanded government 
budget accompanying Korea’s rapid economic growth.  In contrast to 
American think tanks which are private but normally serve as public 
policy advocates, most of the important Korean think tanks are supported 
by the government and they are not independent public policy advocates.  
The Korean public think tanks are highly susceptible to domestic political 
dynamics: for instance, the presidential office’s power over the appoint-
ment of the directors.  The susceptibility originates not only from the 
delayed democratic institutionalization of the Korean presidential system 
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but also from the absence of financial independence, limits to the acces-
sibility of information on policy, and the lack of professionalism in the 
bureaucracy.  The Korea Institute for National Unification, an exemplary  
public think tank regarding the issue of inter-Korean relations, now focuses  
on research and analysis rather than policy advocacy.  Alternatively, it 
acts as a producer of knowledge and vocabulary to envision an epistemic 
community for deliberating strategies of engaging with North Korea.
KEYWORDS:  Korean public think tanks; policy advocate; knowledge 
producer; Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU); inter-Korean 
relations.
*   *   *
The purpose of this article is to examine the role of Korean public 
think tanks, particularly those that pertain to inter-Korean af-
fairs.  Around the world, there are 6,603 think tanks in 182 
countries that are actively engaged in the industry of creating and diffus-
ing knowledge and information.1  However, their roles differ from country 
to country.  Ideally, think tanks are considered policy-idea advocates, and 
their targeted consumers are government branches—such as the execu-
tive and the legislative—and social groups influencing the policymak-
ing processes.  According to this perspective, think tanks will be of little 
use if their voice is not heard by policymakers.2  The main think tanks in 
Washington D.C. are prime models functioning as policy-idea advocates. 
Most of them are private, and their funding sources are diversified.  They 
present certain policy ideas, often reflecting their organizational ideology, 
but most of their policy ideas are based on rigorous analyses and profes-
sional prescriptions.3  To be sure, the American think tanks are not simple 
research institutes.
1James McGann, 2012 Global Go to Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice (Philadelphia, 
Pa.: 2012 Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 4. 
2Diane Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalisation and Non-profit Analysis, Advice and Ad-
vocacy,” Global Society 14, no. 2 (July 2010): 154-55.
3Frank Fischer, “American Think Tanks: Policy Elites and the Politicization of Expertise,” 
Governance 4, no. 3 (July 1991): 332-53; Kent R. Weaver, “The Changing World of Think 
Tanks,” PS: Political Science and Politics 22, no. 3 (September 1989): 563-78.
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By contrast, flourishing Korean think tanks are public ones that are 
finally supported by the government.  They function not as advocates but 
as research institutes.  (There are many private think tanks that are affili-
ated to civil organizations.  Some others are affiliated to private firms and 
religious organizations.  Many of the private think tanks suffer difficulties 
in finding funding sources.4) Why do Korean think tanks differ from those 
in the United States? Do the Korean public think tanks concerning inter-
Korean relations have their own values and missions?  What prevents 
them from becoming policy-idea advocates?
In addressing these questions, the first section of this article traces 
the background of the growth of public think tanks in the 1990s—democ-
ratization, the end of the Cold War, globalization and local autonomy, 
and the government’s budget expansion owing to rapid economic growth. 
The second section describes five public think tanks related to inter-
Korean affairs (four government-supported think tanks and one private, 
public-oriented think tank).  The third section examines how the public 
think tanks are susceptible to domestic political dynamics and why they 
cannot become independent policy-idea advocates.  The Korea Institute 
for National Unification (KINU) is examined as a case study.  In the 
fourth section, KINU’s alternative role is examined: acting as a producer 
of knowledge and vocabulary to envision a “transformative idea” of con-
structing an “epistemic community” concerning inter-Korean affairs, to 
use Howorth’s terms.5  Finally, the article appraises the overall role of 
4Some private think tanks are in good financial shape.  Samsung Economic Research 
Institute (SERI) and Asan Institute for Policy Studies are prime examples.  SERI, with 
Samsung’s background, has successfully solidified its eminent private think tank status in 
the field of economic policy.  The budget of SERI is larger than that of the Korea Develop-
ment Institute, the largest government-supported economic institute in Korea.  SERI’s bud-
get in 2005 exceeded 85 billion Korean won, which is equivalent to USD 76 million.  With 
the generous funding source of the Hyundai group, Asan Institute, established in 2008, has 
been able to project itself as a premier private think tank in the field of international affairs 
and international public policy.  See Yun-Won Hwang, “Jongchaekgyoljong gwajong esoui 
mingan think tank yokhal gwa baljon bangan yongu” (The role of private think tanks in 
the policy making process and future policy implications), Hanguk governance hakhoebo 
(Journal of Korean Association for Governance) (Seoul) 16, no. 3 (December 2009): 6.
5Jolyon Howorth, “Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and 
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Korean public think tanks related to inter-Korean affairs.
Growth of Think Tanks in the 1990s
In examining the growth of think tanks around the world, James 
McGann points out three factors: democratization, globalization, and 
modernization.6  Of the three factors, democratization and globalization 
have significantly contributed to the general development of Korean think 
tanks.  It should be noted that the thawing of the Cold War coincided 
with the processes of democratization and globalization in Korea.  In this 
section, therefore, I need to underscore the three processes that occurred 
simultaneously in Korea: democratization, the thawing of the Cold War, 
and globalization coupled with local autonomy.  First, democratization, 
more than anything else, was conducive to the rise of think tanks in Korea. 
On June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo, the authoritarian ruling party’s presi-
dential candidate, made a sudden statement proposing the introduction of 
direct presidential elections, which had been a controversial issue over 
the years.  The “June 29 Statement” was welcomed by opposition forces 
who had long fought for democratic transition.  It was a model case of the 
desirable “moderate pact” between the ruling camp and the opposition 
forces for a gradual democratic transition, to use O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
terms.7  After the statement, the prominent opposition leader Kim Dae-
jung was released from house arrest and the presidential election became 
heatedly contested.  Furthermore, the former opposition forces expanded 
the scope of democratization from political opposition to a proactive 
movement for expanding various types of rights.  Civil society was em-
Defence Policy,” West European Politics 27, no. 2 (March 2004): 211-34.
6James McGann, “Think Tanks: The Global, Regional and National Dimensions,” in Think 
Tanks in Policy Making: Do They Matter, ed. Andrew Rich et al. (Shanghai: Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Briefing Paper Special Issue, 2011), 10.
7Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986). 
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powered; diverse civil organizations and labor unions sprang up.  Civil 
society addressed new issues, such as Korean unification, economic 
justice, the environment, and labor-management relations.  Civil society 
started uncovering old problems left unexplored in the previous authori-
tarian period.8  Before the June 29 Statement all stripes of the opposition 
movement focused on the fight for democratization, whereas after the 
statement the movement started democratic consolidation, which seemed 
an arduous march at that time.  As the civil society’s struggle aimed for 
changes in the government’s policies, the movement needed to dig out 
hidden information about the past authoritarian rule and had to make rig-
orous counterarguments to dispute authoritarian vestiges in policies and 
practices.
In this context, many civil organizations established their own think 
tanks in the 1990s.  The think thanks served as informational and educa-
tional units in order to make their patron organizations strong and rigorous 
policy advocates.  The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
(PSPD), one of the most steadfast progressive civil organizations, estab-
lished the Institute for Participatory Society to further enhance its capacity 
of appealing PSPD’s policy alternatives to the government and the public 
as well.  In the same vein, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
and Hung Sa Dan (Young Korean Academy) established the Institute for 
Economic Justice and the Hung Sa Dan Headquarters of National Unifi-
cation, respectively.  Interestingly, some model civil organizations dealing 
with environmental issues created think tanks; exemplary cases were the 
Citizens’ Institute for Environmental Studies, the Baedal Environment 
Institute, and the Urban Reform Center.9  Most of the private think tanks, 
nested in the civil organizations, were small in scale but began producing 
8See Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contem-
porary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 231-49; Su-
Hoon Lee, “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society,” Pacific 
Affairs 66, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 351-67; Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization 
in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 
105-36.
9Hwang, “Jongchaekgyoljong gwajong esoui mingan think tank yokhal,” 12-13.
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reports criticizing the continuing old vestiges in the new democratic era.
It is noteworthy that the civil organizations and their think tanks 
did not directly align with the opposition parties, albeit having identical 
agenda items.  For example, unlike the Taiwanese anti-nuclear power 
movements and their organizations aligned with the rising opposition 
party named the Democratic Progressive Party, the main Korean civil or-
ganizations independently engaged in rallies against the construction of 
both nuclear power plants and the storage of nuclear wastes.10  However, 
the absence of a direct political tie in the Korean case did not mean that 
civil activists were apolitical.  Some Korean civil activists were politically 
inclined and ran elections, leaving their organizations.11
Second, the end of the Cold War resulted in a need for ideas and 
knowledge particularly concerning inter-Korean relations.  Whereas de-
mocratization had a great impact on domestic issues, the end of the Cold 
War had enormous consequences for external issues and the grand strategy. 
As early as 1988, the Roh Tae-woo Administration began seriously seeking 
a reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula, thus launching the so-called 
Northern Politics analogous to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.  The fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East European systems in the follow- 
ing year brought an unprecedented shock to the authorities involved in 
inter-Korean relations.  The expedited process of German unification 
forced them to rush to propose concrete actions.  One of the actions was to 
accumulate knowledge related to the prospective Korean unification.  It 
is noteworthy that, in August 1990, lawmakers in the National Assem-
bly, regardless of party affiliation, unanimously supported legislation to 
establish the Research Institute for National Unification, affiliated to 
the Ministry of Unification (MOU).  In 1999, its name was changed to 
10For the discussion about the Taiwan case of party-civil organization connections, see 
Ming-Sho Ho, “The Politics of Anti-Nuclear Protest in Taiwan: A Case of Party-Depen-
dent Movement,” Modern Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (2003): 683-708.
11Exemplary cases are Park Won-soon, who was a founding member of PSPD and was later 
elected Mayor of Seoul in 2011, and Kim Ki-sik, who was the secretary-general of PSPD 
and later became a member of the National Assembly in 2012.  Such practices may be 
considered partly the civil society’s incorporation into or cooptation to the state.
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the Korea Institute for National Unification, and its affiliation also 
changed from MOU to the National Research Council for Humanities and 
Social Sciences under the Prime Minister’s Office.  As shall be discussed 
in detail later, KINU is a leading public think tank that concentrates on 
inter-Korean relations and Korea’s relations with neighboring powers.
Third, globalization as a worldwide trend on the one hand and local 
autonomy in Korea as a domestic political change on the other contrib-
uted to the nurturing of knowledge capacity and then to the rise of think 
tanks.  Globalization in general was not only materialized in the economic 
field, but it also permeated diverse realms such as culture, knowledge, 
and ideas.  Globalization provided non-state actors with more opportuni-
ties for agenda-setting and making inputs to policymakers, both in do-
mestic and international affairs.  Networks and transnational connections 
facilitated these changes, either intentionally or spontaneously.12  Korea 
in the 1990s rode the trend of globalization.  The Kim Young-sam Ad-
ministration declared segyehwa (literally meaning globalization) in 1994 
and made efforts for Korea to enter the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 1996.  With segyehwa and OECD 
membership, the Kim Administration undertook liberalization of the eco-
nomic system, in accordance with international standards.13  To be sure, 
such rapid change in Korea needed enhanced knowledge capacity, particu-
larly organizations to accommodate and supply policy ideas and expertise. 
The Kim Administration made efforts to improve the university research 
environment and raise a new breed of intellectuals.  One of the attempts 
was the allocation of a large amount of money to the so-called Brain 
Korea 21 project.  This project indeed produced many young scholars 
with higher education degrees, both doctoral and master’s degrees.14 
12Diane Stone, “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy 
Institutes,” Governance 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 45-62.
13C. S. Eliot Kang, “The Developmental State and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea,” 
in Korea’s Democratization, ed. Samuel Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 226-34.
14See BK21.  The project has continued until now despite political power shifts.  For the 
project, 130 billion Korean won was allocated from 1999 to 2005, and 180 billion Korean 
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This new breed of intellectuals enriched not only the elite pool in the 
society but also the overall culture of professionalism.
Korea’s globalization efforts paralleled the long-delayed implemen-
tation of local autonomy.  The election of heads of local governments in 
June 1995 finally inaugurated the era of local autonomy.  While this new 
era gradually eroded the remains of the top-down authoritarian rule, local 
governments and their officials—not to mention the newly elected provincial 
governors and city mayors—sought competitive policy ideas.  They not only 
relied on local constituents and organizations but also established new local 
government-supported think tanks to deal with development issues and 
other local problems.15  As of November 2013, there were twenty-three 
public think tanks affiliated to local governments.16  As many theorists 
argue, globalization involved interconnectedness not only among specialized 
parts but also between each part and the global entirety.  This intercon-
nectedness was possible because of the weakening of state boundaries.17 
In Korea, the local governments and their think tanks had to consider 
various types of networks and interactions at the same time.  Rather than 
simply looking up to the central government, they began exploring for 
their own economic project partners and seeking international networks 
and trading partners.  In addition, they started engagements with North 
Korea in the 2000s.  For instance, Gangwon Province was the forerunner 
won from 2006-2012.  At least one tenth of the total project budget was allocated to the 
social sciences.  http://bnc.krf.or.kr/home/link.do?method=get&menuSN=020102 (ac-
cessed March 28, 2013).
15Yun-Won Hwang, “Jongbu bumun think tank ui siltae bunsok gwa baljon banghyang” 
(Governmental think tanks in Korea: past, present, and future), Hanguk governance 
hakhoebo (Journal of Korean Association for Governance) (Seoul) 13, no. 3 (December 
2006): 390.
16The local governments are one special city (Seoul), six metropolitan cities, eight prov-
inces, and one special autonomous province (Jeju).
17See M. Kearney, “The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and 
Transnationalism,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (October 1995): 547-65; Roger 
Keil, “Globalization Makes States: Perspectives of Local Governance in the Age of the 
World City,” Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 616-46; 
Karen Lyons, “Globalization and Social Work: International and Local Implications,” 
British Journal of Social Work 36, no. 3 (April 2006): 365-80.
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in terms of providing humanitarian aid to its divided half, North Gangwon 
Province in the North, as well as to Pyongyang.  Because of Gangwon’s 
geographical proximity and industrial characteristics, the aid focused on 
the forest-insect-prevention project and the providing of potato seeds and 
salmon fry.  Likewise, Gyeonggi Province, bordered with North Korea, 
was a model case of establishing humanitarian interactions with North 
Hwanghae and South Hwanghae Provinces in the North.  Through ground 
transportations, Gyeonggi provided them with medical facilities, agricul- 
tural machines, and food processing facilities.18  The two exemplary local 
governments’ interactions with the North Korean counterparts were partly 
assisted by the Research Institute for Gangwon and the Gyeonggi Research 
Institute, respectively.  It is worth noting that their projects were stimulated 
by the 2000 South-North summit, but it was possible because the local 
autonomy was already institutionalized in the second half of the 1990s.
Finally, a robust Korean economy and the expanding governmental 
budget contributed to the expansion of the idea industry.  In the 1990s, the 
growth of public think tanks was remarkable and, as a result, forty-two 
public think tanks existed as of 2006.19  Each ministry was able to have 
at least one research institute, even if the latter was not always officially 
affiliated to the former.  With related public think tanks, ministries were 
now able to secure necessary information sources such as systematically-
collected databases and survey results.  In particular, the ministries in 
economic and welfare affairs assigned projects to public think tanks for 
examining the feasibility of policy options.  The financial crisis in 1997 
resulted in a change in the affiliation of those public think tanks at the end 
of the 1990s.  With the exception of think tanks in defense and science-
technology, most think tanks in the humanities and social sciences came 
to belong to either the National Research Council for Humanities and 
18Dae-suk Choi et al., Jibang jachidanchae daebuk gyoryu 10 nyon baekso (White paper of 
the local governments’ ten-year cooperation with North Korea) (Seoul: Institute of Unifi-
cation Studies, Ewha Womans University, 2009), 79-112. 
19Hwang, “Jongbu bumun think tank,” 391.  Today there are sixty-seven think tanks that 
financially rely on the central government to varying degrees.
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Social Sciences or the National Research Council for Economics, both 
of which were housed in the Prime Minister’s Office.  The main purpose 
of the change was to cut down the budget and to simplify management. 
With this change, those public think tanks in the disciplines of the hu-
manities and social sciences were no longer directly dependent on related 
ministries in both budget and performance evaluation.  As the financial 
crisis receded, the individual think tanks enjoyed gradual budget increases 
and took advantage of the expanded research independence owing to a 
certain extent to organizational distance from their related ministries.  In 
exchange, they became further alienated from the ministries: less impact 
on policymaking, and less acceptance by the ministry officials.
Public Think Tanks on Inter-Korean Affairs
Inter-Korean affairs require secrecy in many instances.  During the Cold 
War, inter-Korean contacts and South Korean initiatives in them were not 
publicized until any concrete measures were taken.  A prime example was 
the announcement of the July 4 Joint Statement in 1972, for which top of-
ficials of the South and North Koreas secretly met beforehand in Pyong-
yang to make an agreement on the coexistence of the two Koreas.  Even in 
the post-Cold War era, important policy-related matters regarding national 
security and inter-Korean relations have been in the hands of a few close 
associates in the presidential office and those of a few top officials in the 
administration.  Given this, there has been little chance for public think 
tanks to access crucial information related to governmental initiatives.
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, public think tanks have 
played a certain role in sustaining governmental polices pertaining to 
national security and inter-Korean relations.  There are five exemplary 
public think tanks.20  First, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National 
20See http://www.knda.go.kr/english/main/index.jsp; http://www.inss.re.kr/app/main/en.act; 
http://www.kida.re.kr/eng/; http://www.sejong.org/ (accessed March 30, 2013).
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Security (IFANS) was the first governmental think tank in the field of 
national security.  It was in 1963 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) established this think tank to train newly recruited diplomats and 
to conduct analyses of international affairs.  When a ministry-level orga-
nizational change in 2012 resulted in the creation of the Korea National 
Diplomatic Academy, IFANS became a research institute belonging to the 
Academy.  IFANS conducts research on the topics of national security, 
unification, regional issues, international economy and trade.  Those who 
belong to IFANS are public servants, and thus they normally do not chal-
lenge the incumbent administration’s foreign policy.
Second, the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), whose 
origin can be traced back to the Research Institute for International Affairs 
(RIIA) founded in 1977, is a research arm of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS), formerly the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.  It is said 
that the founders of the RIIA tried to emulate the Brookings Institution 
and wanted to make it a premier think tank on national security and inter-
national affairs.21  Such ambition was a pipedream in the authoritarian era. 
The RIIA expanded its organizational and functional capacity to become 
the present INSS in 2007.  Because of its affiliation, however, the main 
function of the INSS is inter-organizational service.  The researchers’ status 
is civilian, but their activities are limited to some extent.
Third, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) was estab-
lished in 1979.  Although the researchers of KIDA are not public servants 
but civilians, the institute is a research arm of the Ministry of Defense. 
Today it houses 143 researchers with either doctoral or master’s degrees. 
No other public think tank in Korea has such manpower.  Furthermore, 
it has built networks of cooperation with defense-related think tanks 
around the world.  With a couple of exceptions recently, ex-generals are 
appointed to the director position, and many researchers are of military 
origin.  KIDA conducts projects on various topics related to defense such 




as the security environment, defense buildup, weapons systems, resource 
management, and military information.
Fourth, the Sejong Institute was established in 1986 as a think tank 
dealing with national strategy and inter-Korean relations.  It is not a gov-
ernment-supported organization, but a non-profit public-oriented institute. 
Sejong is officially registered at the MOFA, but is not affiliated to the 
ministry.  Because of its independent system of finance, management, and 
recruitment, Sejong autonomously conducts mid- and long-term projects 
related to national strategy, unification, area studies, and international po-
litical economy.
Finally, KINU, which was established in 1991, is the most active 
government-supported institute on inter-Korean affairs.  The topics that 
KINU covers include analysis of North Korea, unification policy, interna-
tional relations, and human rights in North Korea.  Inasmuch as the topics 
are diverse, the disciplines of KINU’s researchers are likewise diverse, 
ranging from political science, sociology, and economics, to history, law 
and education.  Just like their disciplines, the academic backgrounds of 
the researchers are also diverse: universities in Korea, the United States, 
Japan, China, Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, etc.  Owing 
to this variety, the researchers can take advantage of relevant language 
skills to expand KINU’s worldwide networks.  Probably the most unique 
aspect of KINU is the North Korean studies.  In their approaches and 
methods, the researchers of KINU differ from its predecessors that oper-
ated during the Cold War—such as the Office of Investigative Studies at 
MOU and the Naewoe News Agency.  The latter were basically North 
Korea watchers who decoded North Korean news media and primary doc-
uments, whereas the new breed of scholars at KINU has adopted social 
science methods and analytical quantitative and qualitative approaches.
For the above-mentioned public think tanks, how to deal with or 
cope with North Korea is the central issue.22  The North Korea issue con-
22Likewise, for the think tanks in the United States, the hottest issue in regard to the Korean 
peninsula is the North Korea issue, particularly its nuclear weapons development.
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sumes the highest level of energy and manpower of the MOFA, MOU, and 
the NIS.  Also, the North Korea issue is of utmost importance in Korean di-
plomacy.23  Thus, it is natural for the public think tanks to take into account 
the main concerns of the related ministries in setting research agendas, 
although they are organizationally independent of the ministries.
Public Think Tanks Susceptible to Domestic Politics
Public think tanks in Korea, particularly those institutes related to inter- 
Korean relations, have been vulnerable to domestic political dynamics 
both during the authoritarian period and until the present.  On that issue, 
the president’s ideological position and his or her perception of North 
Korea are the dominant factors for the administration’s North Korea policy 
direction, formulation, and implementation.  Furthermore, the ideological 
position about and the perception of the North are closely related to the 
administration’s foreign policy—that is, how to value the alliance with the 
United States and how to frame the relations with Japan, China, and Russia. 
In presidential elections, individual candidates start putting their positions 
forward from the beginning.  Once elected, the newly inaugurated presi-
dent tries to change the main tenets of the previous administration’s policy 
toward North Korea, and relevant polices toward neighboring countries. 
President Kim Dae-jung tried to eradicate the Cold War legacy, or the so-
called Cold War culture, as soon as he was inaugurated.24  He formulated 
the Sunshine Policy, a new engagement strategy toward the North, and 
implemented it despite persistent resistance by conservatives.  President 
Roh Moo-hyun mostly followed his predecessor’s policy, slightly modi-
fying it into the Peace and Prosperity Policy.  However, President Lee 
23Interview with Sung Chul Yang, then Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United States, 
May 24, 2001.
24Soon-young Hong, “Thawing Korea’s Cold War: The Path to Peace on the Korean Penin-
sula,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 8-12; Young-Kwan Yoon, “South Korea 




Myung-bak reversed the previous policies and adopted a coercive strategy 
toward North Korea, stressing the North’s denuclearization as the condi-
tion for the expansion of inter-Korean economic cooperation.
To be sure, in Korean politics from the late 1990s to the present time, 
no other external policy has been more divisive than the North Korea 
policy.  The epithets of “red elements,” “red complex,” “North Korea fol-
lowers,” and “backbone conservatives” have been used to depict political 
opponents.25  The importance of the view on North Korea has been evi-
denced in public opinion as well.  According to a survey, most individuals 
in Korea identify their ideological positions, either conservative or pro-
gressive, in terms of their view on North Korea.  That is, how a person 
views North Korea is the independent variable of his or her ideological 
position.  If he or she sees the North as a dialogue partner, then he or she 
is highly likely to identify himself or herself as a progressive.26 In this di-
visive atmosphere and the ensuing polarized politics with regard to North 
Korea, every administration pursues a national consensus as an important 
requisite for the efficacy of the policy.  Top officials make efforts to pro-
mote new policies and concepts and gain public support or tranquilize 
opposing views.27
Owing to differing ideologies and perceptions of the different ad-
ministrations in the last two decades, public think tanks related to inter-
Korean affairs can hardly be independent policy-idea advocates.  They are 
financially government-supported research institutes, and thus they are sup- 
posed to present policy options from which the administration may choose 
to formulate an official policy.  In reality, however, the ideological divide in 
Korean politics, mentioned above, has made those issues related to the 
inter-Korean relations sensitive and delicate to the top leaders.  Therefore, 
25As an example of depicting Korea’s divisive politics using such epithets, see “Editorial: 
Red Complex,” Korea Herald, April 2, 2012, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud 
=20120402000361 (accessed July 12, 2013).
26Myoung-kyu Park et al., Unification Attitude Survey 2012 (Seoul: Institute for Peace and 
Unification Studies, Seoul National University, 2012), 55.
27Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over 
Policies toward North Korea (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), 33-88.
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public think tanks have not been able to present ideas that might be critical 
of or inconsistent with the existing administration’s policy direction.
In KINU’s case, because the timing of its establishment coincided 
with the German unification, the founding spirit was engagement with 
North Korea rather than punitive measures.  This spirit has persisted for 
two decades at KINU.  Engagement needs the development of rigorous 
logic, strategy, and instruments, and thus it requires more painstaking ef-
forts than is necessary for coercion with punitive measures.28  Ironically, 
the progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations did 
not acknowledge KINU’s such stance, but sidelined it.  The two presi-
dents, Kim and Roh, were more proactive than other intellectuals and 
opinion leaders and also more progressive than any high-ranking bureau-
crats in the ministries related to inter-Korean relations.  The progressive 
administrations tended to rely on a few associates to obtain policy advice 
and recommendations: Lim Dong-won and Park Ji-won in the Kim Dae-
jung Administration and Lee Jong-suk in the Roh Administration.  The 
two administrations recruited rank-and-file officials from the so-called 
386 generation, which was a group of young progressive, nationalist in-
tellectuals who were in their 30s, were born in the 1960s, and attended 
college in the 1980s.  In the eyes of the policymakers in the two adminis-
trations, KINU’s spirit seemed to be insufficiently proactive and already 
obsolete.  What they wanted from KINU was to play the role of propagat-
ing the administrations’ policy.  On the contrary, as President Lee Myung-
bak concentrated on the containment of North Korea, KINU was again 
sidelined in a different context.  For his North Korea policy, Lee relied on 
people who were unfamiliar with the North Korea issue or who stressed the 
alliance with the United States—for example, Minister of MOU Hyun In-
taek, NIS Director Won Se-hoon, National Security Advisor Kim Sung-
hwan, and Kim’s associates in the National Security Council.29  These 
28See Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang, “Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alterna-
tive to Coercion,” in Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative, ed. Sung Chull 
Kim and David C. Kang (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2009), 1-19.
29Hyun In-taek was a political science professor at Korea University specializing in security 
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people either checked the activities of the KINU with vigilant eyes or ig-
nored its reports.  As a result, when the Lee Administration needed a policy 
change during the last phase of his presidential term, it was too late for 
public think tanks such as KINU to play the role of policy-idea advocate.
Because of the political gravity of the North Korea policy, the Korean 
public think tanks concerning inter-Korean relations can hardly maintain 
independence.30  Also, there are other reasons why they lack indepen-
dence.  First of all, the Blue House—that is, the presidential office has in 
most cases exercised power over the appointment of the directors of the 
public think tanks.  Following the overall organizational change of those 
think tanks in 1999, the directors are, officially speaking, supposed to be 
chosen by the personnel affairs committee at the related field’s research 
council under the Prime Minister’s Office.  The committee members are 
composed of vice-ministers of relevant ministries and some external mem-
bers.  However, the role of the personnel affairs committee is nominal 
at best.  The presidential system of Korean politics virtually dictates the 
top-down appointment of the directors.  The hand-picked directors have 
to carefully read the government’s policy orientation during their tenure.
Second, the financial dependence constrains the level of indepen-
dence.  Since the nature of the issues is related to unique public affairs, 
for which it is difficult to attract private funding, those think tanks have to 
rely solely on the government budget.31  As for the budget, KINU rests on 
the National Research Council of Humanities and Social Sciences, KIDA 
studies and Asia-Pacific alliances; Kim Sung-hwan and top NSC officials were recruited 
with MOFA officials or proponents of the U.S.-Korea alliance.  On the other hand, Won 
Se-hoon was not a security person but a career bureaucrat to become Vice Mayor of 
Seoul under Mayor Lee Myung-bak.  As the composition of the Lee Administration’s 
team of security affairs advisors illustrates, the inter-Korea relations and the North Korea 
policy had no place to be considered seriously by them and thus was subordinated to in-
ternational security matters such as the nuclear issue. 
30It is fair to say that a lack of independence is a critical problem for the public think tanks 
in general.  See Ihn-hwi Park, “Segehwa sidae ui woegyojongch gwa think tank” (Foreign 
policy and think tanks in the age of globalization), Kukje chongchi nonchong (Korean 
Journal of International Studies) (Seoul) 52, no. 2 (June 2012): 93-116.
31An exception is the Hyundai group, a top conglomerate, which has been active in inter-
Korean relations, but it also has its own private think tank.
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relies on the Ministry of Defense, and INSS depends on NIS.  Their fi-
nancial reliance has interfered with independence not merely during the 
period of the financial crisis in the late 1990s but ever since their estab-
lishment.32  After the crisis was over, the government was able to gradually 
expand its budget allocation to the think tanks in the 2000s, especially for 
research funds.  However, the budget increase has not provided them with 
independence.
Third, the lack of independence can be attributed to the scarcity of 
information necessary for the public think tanks to do their job properly. 
For example, they cannot access top-secret intelligence.  At the time of 
preparing for the Kim Dae-jung-Kim Jong-il summit in 2000, KINU 
had no opportunity to access information related to the Hyundai group’s 
deal with North Korea—a US$500 million aid package that paved the 
way for the summit.33  Without such information, but with only a flurry 
of rumors, KINU’s reporting to MOU and the Blue House could be 
neither a rigorous analysis nor relevant policy recommendations for the 
scheduled summit.  Along with many other reasons, the lack of informa-
tion sidelined the public think tank at this important juncture in inter-
Korean relations.
In this context, the public think tanks cannot advocate new, innova-
tive policy ideas.  Inter-Korean issues are politically too sensitive; the 
policies related to inter-Korean relations are controlled directly by the 
Blue House or at best by the collectivity of Blue House-MOFA-MOU-
NIS.  Frequently, the presidents rely on close associates, from the initial 
stage of policy planning, to the stage of examining its feasibility, and up 
to the final stage of implementing and executing it.  Examples of such 
32Kwangho Jung, “Jongchaek gwajong esoui miguk think tank ui hwaldong gwa yokhal e 
gwanhan yebijok bunsok” (A preliminary analysis of policy activities and roles of U.S. 
think tanks), Haengjong nonchong (Korea Journal of Public Administration) (Seoul) 44, 
no. 1 (March 2006): 265-304.
33The so-called remittance scandal was later revealed by the independent counsel’s special 
investigation team in August 2003.  The team found that the remittance was intended to 
succeed the summit and that the government arranged for Hyundai Asan to get loans from 
the Korean Development Bank in an illicit way.
ISSUES & STUDIES
140 March 2014
close associates were Park Cheol-eon in the Roh Tae-woo Administration, 
Lim Dong-won and Park Ji-won in the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Lee 
Jong-suk in the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, and Hyun In-taek and 
Kim Tae-hyo in the Lee Myung-bak Administration.34
Alternative Role: Knowledge Producer
As the public think tanks cannot play the role of policy-idea advo-
cates, they have sought an alternative role and at least have made progress 
toward becoming self-sustaining.  Let me focus on KINU’s case.  First, 
KINU now focuses on research and analysis rather than playing a short-
range policy-idea advocate role.  The researchers consider short-term 
policy suggestions a secondary, obligatory job.  For them, the analysis of 
the current situation and its mid- and long-term policy implications are 
more important criteria than the short-term effects of policy outcomes for 
their self-evaluation and external evaluation.  At KINU there are three 
pillars of research focus: (1) the analysis of North Korea, (2) unification 
policy, and (3) the analysis of the environment for unification.  These 
pillars are interconnected in that each supports the others.  KINU’s basic 
function is analysis, and this is also true from the consumers’ perspec-
tive.  For the media, the most interesting topics are analyses of the North 
Korean situation regarding food, politics, human rights, etc. (see table 1). 
Furthermore, unification policy analysis does not aim at advocating short-
term policy ideas, but mid- and long-term projections.  In part, this trend 
can be attributed to the new organizational structure that is supervised by 
the National Research Council of Humanities and Social Sciences belong-
ing to the Prime Minister’s Office.  While KINU does not have to be held 
accountable for its relevant ministry MOU, it now has to be attentive to 
the evaluations made by that research council.
34Interview with Chang Yong-suk, a former NSC official in the Roh Administration, No-
vember 5, 2013.
Politics, Knowledge, and Inter-Korean Affairs
March 2014 141 
Table 1
News Coverage of KINU (Research Reports, Presentations, and Interviews)
Date Content Type
03/04/2013 NK human rights in prison camps Analysis 
02/15 Policy toward NK Policy
02/13 NK internal meeting Analysis 
02/07 NK nuclear test Analysis
01/28 NK food shortage Analysis 
01/28 NK food shortage Analysis 
01/02 NK internal illicit practices Analysis 
01/02 NK new year address Analysis 
12/14/2012 NK nuclear issue Analysis 
12/11 NK missile issue Analysis
12/09 NK missile issue Analysis
12/04 NK internal politics Analysis
11/24 NK missile issue Analysis
11/23 Policy toward NK Policy 
11/17 Policy toward NK; SK-US-NK relations Policy
11/15 NK arms sale; UN sanctions Analysis; Policy 
11/08 NK-US relations Analysis
11/05 Aid to NK refugees Policy
10/09 NK missile issue Analysis
10/08 NK internal control Analysis
10/04 NK political system; nuclear issue Analysis
09/28 NK internal politics Analysis
09/21 Multilateral engagement in NK Policy
09/19 Policy toward NK Policy
08/28 NK internal politics Analysis
08/21 Inter-Korean economic project Policy 
08/10 NK economic policy Analysis
08/08 NK-Japan relations Analysis
08/04 NK-Japan relations Analysis
08/01 NK internal politics; economic policy Analysis
07/18 NK internal purge Analysis
07/17 NK internal purge Analysis
07/02 NK-China economic relations Analysis
06/14 International cooperation on NK human rights Analysis; Policy
06/13 International cooperation on NK human rights Analysis; Policy
06/05 NK internal festival Analysis
05/22 NK-China relations; NK internal politics Analysis
05/18 NK food shortage; human rights Analysis (cited by Le Figaro)
04/24 NK politics and military Analysis
04/23 NK-China-SK relations Analysis; Policy
04/16 NK internal politics Analysis
04/14 NK internal politics Analysis
04/12 NK political succession Analysis
04/04 NK missile and internal politics Analysis
Source:  Dong-A Ilbo, April 1, 2012 to March 20, 2013, http://news.donga.com/search?p=1
&query=%ED%86%B5%EC%9D%BC%EC%97%B0%EA%B5%AC%EC%9B%90&che
ck_news=1&more=1&sorting=1&search_date=2&v1=&v2= (accessed March 31, 2013).
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Analytical monographs on North Korea are most quoted and used by 
officials, academics, and the media.  In KINU’s early years, representa-
tive basic research focuses were either annotated bibliographies on works 
written by the North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, or 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the main periodicals published by 
the Korean Workers’ Party in North Korea.35  Today the researchers also 
regard the production of basic but usable knowledge as their main task.
Second, KINU has expanded its networks at the institutional level. 
In the globalized world, partners of think tanks can not only be other think 
tanks, but also local and international organizations.36  This is the case for 
KINU as well.  The Research Council of Unification Policy, presided over 
by the director of KINU, is a prime example of domestic networking.  The 
council is now composed of 42 organizations: many government-supported 
institutes and some private think tanks.  Engagement with North Korea 
requires concerted efforts in various fields, including economic coopera-
tion, the connection of infrastructures, cultural and academic exchanges, 
medical assistance, energy supply, the exploration of tourist sites, etc. 
The member organizations of the Council have worked together not only 
among themselves, but also with local governments and their auxiliary 
organizations.  An exemplary case of such collaboration was a workshop 
held in November 2002 to explore the possibility of linking inter-Korean 
tourist cooperation to local tourism—that is, Mount Kumgang (located in 
North Korea) tourism to Mount Sorak (the adjacent area in South Korea) 
tourism.  Indeed, this kind of cooperation requires the active participation 
of relevant local governments as well as an improvement in overall inter-
Korean relations.
These new efforts are both a response to KINU’s less effective policy- 
idea advocacy and a consequence of deepening globalization.  Knowledge 
35Philo Kim, Kim Il-sung jojak haeje (Annotated bibliography of the collected works of 
Kim Il-sung) (Seoul: KINU, 1993); Philo Kim, Kim Jong-il jojak haeje (Annotated bib-
liography of the collected works of Kim Jong-il) (Seoul: KINU, 1993); Kyo-Duk Lee, 
Joson jonsahaeje (Annotated bibliography of Korean History) (Seoul: KINU, 1994) and 
Gulloja haeje (Annotated bibliography of workers) (Seoul: KINU, 1995).
36Stone, “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer,” 49-51.
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diffusion has already become a norm for this public think tank.  Confer-
ences and workshops are not merely an opportunity to learn about others; 
they provide the participating organizations with a chance to build an 
epistemic community for deliberating the strategy of engagement with, 
rather than containing, North Korea.  KINU’s international partners are 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the United States 
Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., the China Institute of Contempo-
rary International Relations in Beijing, the Shanghai Institute for Interna-
tional Studies in Shanghai, the Institute of World Economy and Interna-
tional Relations and the Institute of Far Eastern Studies (belonging to the 
Russian Academy of Sciences) in Moscow, the Institute for International 
Policy Studies and the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.
In general, the mode of operation of Korea’s public think tanks differs 
from that of influential American think tanks, most of which are private. 
The latter’s basic role is to put forward policy ideas, and close political 
connection is customary.  In the United States, the think tank members 
participate in politics as opportunities arise, and then return to their 
original positions at their think tanks as the need ends.  This so-called 
revolving-door practice is considered normal.  By contrast, in the Korean 
case—as illustrated by KINU—think tanks strive to be free of politics.
As a knowledge producer and networker, KINU may enjoy some 
advantages as well.  It can draw wide public attention, and its knowledge 
consumers are diverse.  These consumers consist not only of the MOU, 
MOFA, and NIS, but also of academics and international organizations. 
For instance, KINU opened the Center for North Korean Human Rights 
in 1994 and started the publication of the annual White Paper on Human 
Rights in North Korea in 1996.37  The annual white paper is often cited 
by the U.N. Human Rights Council’s special rapporteur, Human Rights 
Watch, and the U.S. Department of State, etc.  The White Paper and other 
37Precursors of the studies on human rights in North Korea, before the launching of the 
KINU Center for Human Rights in North Korea, are Asia Watch (later Human Rights 




projects do not simply uncover serious violation cases such as political 
prisoner camps and public executions, but also illuminate the North Korean 
cases through the lenses of international laws and norms.
Since the 1990s, KINU has often been the first-time user of some 
new vocabularies with which Korean government officials and the gen-
eral public had been unfamiliar.  The use of such terms as “durability” 
(or sustainability), “private channels,” “engagement,” “unification cost,” 
“unification clock,” “human rights in North Korea,” “governance,” and 
“humanitarian aid” has expanded the scope and domain of studies related 
to inter-Korean relations.38  Rich, an American think tank analyst, views a 
think tank’s influence in terms of its role in framing issues and addressing 
policy alternatives from the early stages in a debate.39  Following Rich’s 
view, KINU’s provision of new vocabulary has certainly influenced the 
government’s policy making.  Indeed, KINU researchers professed the 
need to open “private channels” in inter-Korean relations in the second 
half of Kim Young-sam’s presidency (1993-1998).  This was intended to 
resolve the deadlock that could be attributed to Kim’s refusal to provide 
further humanitarian aid to the North after Pyongyang’s humiliation of 
a Korean governmental food aid shipment in 1995.40  The use of private 
channels eventually became a norm in the successor administration led by 
Kim Dae-jung.
38Related works are, to name a few only, Young-ho Park and Hyung-gi Kim, 2011 nyon 
tongil yeochuk sigye (The unification clock in 2011) (Seoul: KINU, 2011); Kyu-ryoon 
Kim, Han-bum Cho, and Kang-taek Lim, Tongil biyong, pyeonik sarye yeongu (A com-
prehensive study of unification cost and benefit) (Seoul: KINU, 2011); Korea Institute 
for National Unification, ed., Kukjesahoeui gaebal jiwoon iron gwa silje: Bukhan gaebal 
jiwoon ul wihan mosaek (Theory and practice of international institutions’ development 
assistance) (Seoul: KINU, 2008); Sung Chull Kim et al., North Korea in Crisis: An As-
sessment of Regime Sustainability (Seoul: KINU, 1997); Soo-am Kim, “Policy Environ-
ment and Directions for North Korean Human Rights,” International Journal of Korean 
Unification Studies 21, no. 2 (December 2012): 33-60.
39Andrew Rich, “U.S. Think Tanks and the Intersection of Ideology, Advocacy, and Influ-
ence,” NIRA Review (Winter 2001): 54-59; Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and 
the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
40In 1995, North Korea forced a South Korean ship that carried rice to fly the North Korean 
flag at the Chongjin port.  Korean conservatives in particular considered this incident a 
humiliation, symbolically depicting it as “giving rice, but slapped on the cheek.”
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As for methodology, comparative studies have become one of the 
most frequently used methods in North Korean studies.  Complex systems 
theory, decision-making models, and game theory have been applied to the 
analysis of North Korean behavior and inter-Korean relations.  Also, the 
potential utility of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has 
been an important area of analysis.41  All in all, the projects represent 
analyses relevant to long-term visions of inter-Korean relations and to the 
institutionalization of a prospective unified Korea.
Conclusion
From a broad perspective, it is fair to say that the delayed democratic 
consolidation has made politics prevail over innovative policy-ideas about 
inter-Korean relations, in which public think tanks, particularly KINU in 
this study, should have been the main actors.  The national division has 
been the long-term causal source of the ideological polarization, and the 
latter, paired with regional divide, has contributed to retarding democratic 
consolidation.  Apparently the North Korea policy has been one of the 
top agenda items both during the authoritarian rule and in the democratic 
era.  The policy has not only captured much public attention, but has also 
consumed tremendous national energy as well.  But the public consensus, 
or public opinion, has not been the main source of the policymaking.  The 
41For instance, Keum-soon Lee and Soo-am Kim, Kukjesahoe ui ingwongaeseon jeonryak: 
iron gwa silje (The international society’s strategy of improving human rights: theory and 
practice) (Seoul: KINU, 2008); Kuk-shin Kim et al., Bokjapgye iron ul tonghan Bukhan 
ui jeongsang gukgahwa bangan yeongu (A policy study for the normal statization of 
North Korea: complex systems approach) (Seoul: KINU, 2009); Woo-taek Hong, Bukhan 
haekmunje ui jeonmang gwa daeungchaek: jeongchaek gyoljeong model ul iyonghan jeol- 
lyak bunseok (Prospects and prescription of the North Korean nuclear issue: a strategic 
analysis applying the decision-making model) (Seoul: KINU: 2012).
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president, close associates to the president in the Blue House, and like-
minded ministers in the administration have dominated related informa-
tion and policymaking processes.  That is, the expansion of civil society 
and the growth of public think tanks have not been followed by the full 
advocacy of policy ideas in Korea’s democratic processes.
The lack of professionalism in the Korean bureaucracy has also con-
tributed to discouraging the public think tanks’ role of policy-advocate. 
Upon a new president’s taking power, bureaucrats line up to read the 
president’s motives and the Blue House’s policy line.42  They are sensitive 
to the top only; they are neither attentive nor receptive to any ideas differ-
ent from the superior offices, as otherwise they cannot be protected.  The 
bureaucrats do not want the public think tanks to become independent 
advocates providing ideas that are not in accordance with those of the 
superior offices.  Given this, there has been little room for public think 
tanks to play the role of policy-idea advocates in the field of inter-Korean 
relations.
On the other hand, different roles of think tanks should be acknowl-
edged in different political systems.43  The Korean presidential system 
in the situation of national division has provided the presidents with pre-
rogatives over external policies, sidelining the power of the unicameral 
legislature.  This situation differs substantially from that of the U.S. presi-
dential system in which the bicameral legislature has a powerful check 
over the president.  The U.S. case creates an authority structure in which 
think tanks, either private or public, can make their best efforts to put 
their ideas through legislation as well as in the public domain.  By con-
trast, Korea and Japan have shared a commonality with regard to the pub-
lic think tanks’ limited role particularly in recent years.  While exerting 
42The lack of professionalism differs from bureaucratic exclusiveness.  For the latter argu-
ment, see Yeonho Lee, “Jagun jongbu rul mandulgi wihan think tank ui yokhal” (The role 
of think tanks to make a smaller and more effective government), Kukje chongchi non-
chong (Korean Journal of International Studies) (Seoul) 49, no. 2 (June 2009): 129-53; 
Park, “Segehwa sidae ui woegyojongchaek,” 111.
43See Donald Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?  Assessing the Impact of Public Policy In-
stitutes (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).
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Tokyo’s proactive role in the international security realm, Prime Minister 
Abe Shinzo (2006-2007, 2012-present) has relied more on private consul-
tative panels than ever before for both obtaining ideas on crucial national 
security issues and rationalizing his ideas on them.44  The Japan Institute 
of International Affairs (JIIA) is the top public think tank in Japan per-
taining to national security and international relations issues.  As of 2012, 
JIIA was ranked second among the think tanks in Asia, including China, 
India, Japan, and Korea.45  But Abe has chosen to request reports from the 
private panels that are composed of scholars, retired diplomats, and busi-
ness leaders.  Abe’s case is similar to the Korean presidents’ dependence 
on close associates.
In inter-Korean affairs, the voice of public think tanks will likely 
not be heard by the top policymakers until Korean politics undergoes a 
dramatic change in the system, culture, and practice.  In the meantime, 
public think tanks must find a way of achieving financial independence, 
even if partly.  Achieving the latter will not discourage think tanks even in 
the case of political intervention in their organizational affairs, such as the 
appointment of directors.  Otherwise, public think tanks may choose to 
remain research institutes, particularly as producers of usable knowledge 
and vocabulary.  On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the role 
of Korean public think tanks related to inter-Korean affairs is not neces-
sarily disappointing.  As the KINU case shows, they have played a certain 
44For instance, Abe, as prime minister, asked the Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal 
Foundation of the National Security to present a report on a reinterpretation of the con-
stitution.  The report, published in June 2008, made a revisionist interpretation of Article 
9 of the constitution: allowing collective self-defense based on the strengthened U.S.-
Japan alliance.  This report became the foundation of another report delivered in October 
2013 by the successor panel.  The recent report states that: “the national security should 
become a top agenda cutting across the entire governmental tasks.”  See Panel on the Re-
construction of the Legal Foundation of the National Security, “Report of the Panel on the 
Reconstruction of the Legal Foundation of the National Security,” June 24, 2008, http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/houkokusho.pdf (accessed November 7, 2013); 
and “Kokka anpo senryaku no gaiyo yoshi” (Summary of the strategy of national security), 
Sankei Shimbun, October 22, 2013, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/print/131022/
plc13102209010004-c.htm (accessed November 7, 2013).
45McGann, 2012 Global Go to Think Tanks Report, 57-58.
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alternative role—trying to envision a transformative epistemic community 
of engagement with the North.  Also, their spirit of engagement, neither 
radical nor reserved, has become a norm in various policy-oriented intel-
lectual circles.
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